Mercurial > hg > nginx
changeset 9191:618132842e7c
QUIC: ignore duplicate PATH_CHALLENGE frames.
According to RFC 9000, an endpoint SHOULD NOT send multiple PATH_CHALLENGE
frames in a single packet. The change adds a check to enforce this claim to
optimize server behavior. Previously each PATH_CHALLENGE always resulted in a
single response datagram being sent to client. The effect of this was however
limited by QUIC flood protection.
Also, PATH_CHALLENGE is explicitly disabled in Initial and Handshake levels,
see RFC 9000, Table 3. However, technically it may be sent by client in 0-RTT
over a new path without actual migration, even though the migration itself is
prohibited during handshake. This allows client to coalesce multiple 0-RTT
packets each carrying a PATH_CHALLENGE and end up with multiple PATH_CHALLENGEs
per datagram. This again leads to suboptimal behavior, see above. Since the
purpose of sending PATH_CHALLENGE frames in 0-RTT is unclear, these frames are
now only allowed in 1-RTT. For 0-RTT they are silently ignored.
author | Roman Arutyunyan <arut@nginx.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 22 Nov 2023 14:48:12 +0400 |
parents | 3a67dd34b6cc |
children | efcdaa66df2e |
files | src/event/quic/ngx_event_quic_migration.c src/event/quic/ngx_event_quic_transport.h |
diffstat | 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) [+] |
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--- a/src/event/quic/ngx_event_quic_migration.c Wed Nov 22 14:52:21 2023 +0400 +++ b/src/event/quic/ngx_event_quic_migration.c Wed Nov 22 14:48:12 2023 +0400 @@ -40,6 +40,14 @@ ngx_quic_frame_t frame, *fp; ngx_quic_connection_t *qc; + if (pkt->level != ssl_encryption_application || pkt->path_challenged) { + ngx_log_debug0(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_EVENT, c->log, 0, + "quic ignoring PATH_CHALLENGE"); + return NGX_OK; + } + + pkt->path_challenged = 1; + qc = ngx_quic_get_connection(c); ngx_memzero(&frame, sizeof(ngx_quic_frame_t));