From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Sun Oct 25 17:58:02 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?utf-8?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2026 20:58:02 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Tests: compatibility with OpenSSL 4.1
Message-ID: <7a191a1f819d977261db.1792951082@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>

# HG changeset patch
# User Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
# Date 1792947499 -10800
#      Sun Oct 25 19:58:19 2026 +0300
# Node ID 7a191a1f819d977261db98271a77219204926a4a
# Parent  84c77c54e70f9740676c678bd46d3650727d77e7
Tests: compatibility with OpenSSL 4.1.

In OpenSSL 4.1, the X509_check_host() function no longer tries to check
CNs in certificates (including when there are no subject alternative
names defined in the certificate), following the changes introduced by
RFC 9525.

Accordingly, relevant certificate verification tests
(proxy_ssl_verify.t, etc.) were updated to expect failures during
verification of certificates with a CN only when using OpenSSL 4.1.
Additionally, grpc_ssl.t was updated to provide the correct subject
alternative name in the certificate being verified, unbreaking the test
with OpenSSL 4.1.

diff --git a/grpc_ssl.t b/grpc_ssl.t
--- a/grpc_ssl.t
+++ b/grpc_ssl.t
@@ -96,12 +96,27 @@ http {
 
 EOF
 
-$t->write_file('openssl.conf', <<EOF);
+$t->write_file('openssl.localhost.conf', <<EOF);
 [ req ]
+prompt = no
+default_bits = 2048
+encrypt_key = no
+distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
+x509_extensions = v3_req
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+commonName = localhost
+[ v3_req ]
+subjectAltName = DNS:localhost
+EOF
+
+$t->write_file('openssl.client.conf', <<EOF);
+[ req ]
+prompt = no
 default_bits = 2048
 encrypt_key = no
 distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
 [ req_distinguished_name ]
+commonName = client
 EOF
 
 my $d = $t->testdir();
@@ -109,7 +124,7 @@ my $tr = `openssl genrsa -help 2>&1` =~ 
 
 foreach my $name ('localhost') {
 	system('openssl req -x509 -new '
-		. "-config $d/openssl.conf -subj /CN=$name/ "
+		. "-config $d/openssl.$name.conf "
 		. "-out $d/$name.crt -keyout $d/$name.key "
 		. ">>$d/openssl.out 2>&1") == 0
 		or die "Can't create certificate for $name: $!\n";
@@ -120,7 +135,7 @@ foreach my $name ('client') {
 		. "-aes128 $tr 2048 >>$d/openssl.out 2>&1") == 0
 		or die "Can't create private key: $!\n";
 	system('openssl req -x509 -new '
-		. "-config $d/openssl.conf -subj /CN=$name/ "
+		. "-config $d/openssl.$name.conf "
 		. "-out $d/$name.crt "
 		. "-key $d/$name.key -passin pass:$name"
 		. ">>$d/openssl.out 2>&1") == 0
diff --git a/proxy_ssl_verify.t b/proxy_ssl_verify.t
--- a/proxy_ssl_verify.t
+++ b/proxy_ssl_verify.t
@@ -185,7 +185,14 @@ like(http_get('/fail'), qr/502 Bad/ms, '
 
 # commonName
 
+TODO: {
+local $TODO = 'rejected by OpenSSL 4.1.0+'
+	if $t->has_feature('openssl:4.1.0');
+
 like(http_get('/cn'), qr/200 OK/ms, 'verify cn');
+
+}
+
 like(http_get('/cn/fail'), qr/502 Bad/ms, 'verify cn fail');
 
 # untrusted
diff --git a/stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t b/stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t
--- a/stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t
+++ b/stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t
@@ -160,7 +160,14 @@ isnt(get(8082), 'OK', 'verify fail');
 
 # commonName
 
+TODO: {
+local $TODO = 'rejected by OpenSSL 4.1.0+'
+	if $t->has_feature('openssl:4.1.0');
+
 is(get(8083), 'OK', 'verify cn');
+
+}
+
 isnt(get(8084), 'OK', 'verify cn fail');
 
 # untrusted
diff --git a/uwsgi_ssl_verify.t b/uwsgi_ssl_verify.t
--- a/uwsgi_ssl_verify.t
+++ b/uwsgi_ssl_verify.t
@@ -177,7 +177,14 @@ like(http_get('/fail'), qr/502 Bad/ms, '
 
 # commonName
 
+TODO: {
+local $TODO = 'rejected by OpenSSL 4.1.0+'
+	if $t->has_feature('openssl:4.1.0');
+
 like(http_get('/cn'), qr/200 OK/ms, 'verify cn');
+
+}
+
 like(http_get('/cn/fail'), qr/502 Bad/ms, 'verify cn fail');
 
 # untrusted


From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 03:15:59 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 06:15:59 +0300
Subject: [nginx-tests] Tests: compatibility with OpenSSL 4.1.
Message-ID: <hg.7a191a1f819d.1793070959.5300362857107991016@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx-tests/rev/7a191a1f819d
branches:  
changeset: 2092:7a191a1f819d
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Sun Oct 25 19:58:19 2026 +0300
description:
Tests: compatibility with OpenSSL 4.1.

In OpenSSL 4.1, the X509_check_host() function no longer tries to check
CNs in certificates (including when there are no subject alternative
names defined in the certificate), following the changes introduced by
RFC 9525.

Accordingly, relevant certificate verification tests
(proxy_ssl_verify.t, etc.) were updated to expect failures during
verification of certificates with a CN only when using OpenSSL 4.1.
Additionally, grpc_ssl.t was updated to provide the correct subject
alternative name in the certificate being verified, unbreaking the test
with OpenSSL 4.1.

diffstat:

 grpc_ssl.t                |  21 ++++++++++++++++++---
 proxy_ssl_verify.t        |   7 +++++++
 stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t |   7 +++++++
 uwsgi_ssl_verify.t        |   7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diffs (104 lines):

diff --git a/grpc_ssl.t b/grpc_ssl.t
--- a/grpc_ssl.t
+++ b/grpc_ssl.t
@@ -96,12 +96,27 @@ http {
 
 EOF
 
-$t->write_file('openssl.conf', <<EOF);
+$t->write_file('openssl.localhost.conf', <<EOF);
 [ req ]
+prompt = no
+default_bits = 2048
+encrypt_key = no
+distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
+x509_extensions = v3_req
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+commonName = localhost
+[ v3_req ]
+subjectAltName = DNS:localhost
+EOF
+
+$t->write_file('openssl.client.conf', <<EOF);
+[ req ]
+prompt = no
 default_bits = 2048
 encrypt_key = no
 distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
 [ req_distinguished_name ]
+commonName = client
 EOF
 
 my $d = $t->testdir();
@@ -109,7 +124,7 @@ my $tr = `openssl genrsa -help 2>&1` =~ 
 
 foreach my $name ('localhost') {
 	system('openssl req -x509 -new '
-		. "-config $d/openssl.conf -subj /CN=$name/ "
+		. "-config $d/openssl.$name.conf "
 		. "-out $d/$name.crt -keyout $d/$name.key "
 		. ">>$d/openssl.out 2>&1") == 0
 		or die "Can't create certificate for $name: $!\n";
@@ -120,7 +135,7 @@ foreach my $name ('client') {
 		. "-aes128 $tr 2048 >>$d/openssl.out 2>&1") == 0
 		or die "Can't create private key: $!\n";
 	system('openssl req -x509 -new '
-		. "-config $d/openssl.conf -subj /CN=$name/ "
+		. "-config $d/openssl.$name.conf "
 		. "-out $d/$name.crt "
 		. "-key $d/$name.key -passin pass:$name"
 		. ">>$d/openssl.out 2>&1") == 0
diff --git a/proxy_ssl_verify.t b/proxy_ssl_verify.t
--- a/proxy_ssl_verify.t
+++ b/proxy_ssl_verify.t
@@ -185,7 +185,14 @@ like(http_get('/fail'), qr/502 Bad/ms, '
 
 # commonName
 
+TODO: {
+local $TODO = 'rejected by OpenSSL 4.1.0+'
+	if $t->has_feature('openssl:4.1.0');
+
 like(http_get('/cn'), qr/200 OK/ms, 'verify cn');
+
+}
+
 like(http_get('/cn/fail'), qr/502 Bad/ms, 'verify cn fail');
 
 # untrusted
diff --git a/stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t b/stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t
--- a/stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t
+++ b/stream_proxy_ssl_verify.t
@@ -160,7 +160,14 @@ isnt(get(8082), 'OK', 'verify fail');
 
 # commonName
 
+TODO: {
+local $TODO = 'rejected by OpenSSL 4.1.0+'
+	if $t->has_feature('openssl:4.1.0');
+
 is(get(8083), 'OK', 'verify cn');
+
+}
+
 isnt(get(8084), 'OK', 'verify cn fail');
 
 # untrusted
diff --git a/uwsgi_ssl_verify.t b/uwsgi_ssl_verify.t
--- a/uwsgi_ssl_verify.t
+++ b/uwsgi_ssl_verify.t
@@ -177,7 +177,14 @@ like(http_get('/fail'), qr/502 Bad/ms, '
 
 # commonName
 
+TODO: {
+local $TODO = 'rejected by OpenSSL 4.1.0+'
+	if $t->has_feature('openssl:4.1.0');
+
 like(http_get('/cn'), qr/200 OK/ms, 'verify cn');
+
+}
+
 like(http_get('/cn/fail'), qr/502 Bad/ms, 'verify cn fail');
 
 # untrusted

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 05:41:53 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?utf-8?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 08:41:53 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 0 of 3] patches based on fixes by F5
Message-ID: <patchbomb.1793079713@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>

Hello!

The following patch series addresses issues relevant to freenginx among
those recently fixed by F5 as security issues in F5 NGINX.  In
particular:

- Fixed use of an uninitialized TLS session ticket key when automatic
  ticket key rotation is used, which makes it possible to forge SSL
  sessions and bypass SSL certificate authentication (CVE-2026-97629);

- Fixed a segmentation fault which might occur with many SSI includes
  when using AIO (CVE-2026-97205, though not considered to be a security
  issue in freenginx, see below);

- Fixed handling of unknown frames when reading a request body in the
  experimental HTTP/3 implementation (CVE-2026-95101, though not
  considered to be a security issue in freenginx, see below).


Detailed analysis of the issues fixed by F5:

    *) Security: a buffer overflow might occur in a worker process when
       using the "alias" directive if the request URI was changed by the
       "rewrite" directive and was then mapped to a file path
       (CVE-2026-15176).

Relevant commit:

Avoid post-rewrite URI to path mapping with alias
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/f8a23425bd6840c4c36b4264edf576ba3646156f

In freenginx, the issue cannot happen due to mitigations introduced in
9493:aae28b083279 (freenginx 1.29.7).  Also, the security impact is
questionable, since the bug can be triggered only with a specially
crafted configuration.

    *) Security: a buffer overflow might occur in a worker process while
       evaluating string expressions with variables, which affected the
       document root calculation and request logging in the http and stream
       modules (CVE-2026-93479).
       Thanks to Matt Suiche of Tolmo Inc.

Relevant commit:

Script: reserved memory overrun protection in ngx_http_script_run()
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/6aa4b3fdd4fdc156153f2981eb4070690624447c

In freenginx, the affected code is not present.  Further, since
9577:5bfb1aa8b443 (freenginx 1.31.4) the underlying problem with
incorrect length calculations is fixed.

    *) Security: when using HTTP/3 a part of an unknown frame might be
       treated as the request body, which might result in bypassing the
       "client_max_body_size" limit or injecting data in the proxied request
       (CVE-2026-95101).
       Thanks to Hansol Lee of GOTROOT.

Relevant commit:

HTTP/3: kept the skipped frame length separate from data length
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/1c173a2d8767730e678c27446138d7ae5dd6fd64

The issue is valid and affects freenginx.  The patch looks good and
is included in this patch series.  However, since the issue is in the
experimental HTTP/3 code, it is not considered to be a security issue.

    *) Security: when using TLS session ticket key rotation, one of the keys
       was left uninitialized, which might allow to forge a session
       (CVE-2026-97629).
       Thanks to PhiNode Labs.

Relevant commit:

SSL: synced all session ticket keys to the worker process
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/1916f26e6ca49296568633d309777e36527e5bb2

The issue is valid and affects freenginx.  The patch included in this
patch series is identical to the one from F5 (which is trivial), though
it provides a more relevant commit message.

    *) Security: when using asynchronous file I/O (AIO), use-after-free
       might occur in certain configurations if the SSI page has "include
       virtual" commands (CVE-2026-97205).
       Thanks to cyberlancer.

Relevant commit:

Limited the number of pending operations per request
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/6adfc05ece48f92446383ec1f145446848694698

The issue looks valid and affects freenginx.  However, triggering the
issue requires a configuration with AIO enabled and control over a
resource processed by SSI, which is not expected to be available to
external attackers and implies at least a DoS impact.  Further,
exploiting this issue for anything beyond DoS seems unlikely.  As such,
it is not considered to be a security issue.  An alternative patch to
address this issue is included in this patch series.


-- 
Maxim Dounin


From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 05:41:54 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?utf-8?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 08:41:54 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 1 of 3] SSL: fixed syncing of keys with automatic ticket key
 rotation
In-Reply-To: <patchbomb.1793079713@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>
References: <patchbomb.1793079713@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>
Message-ID: <d08712494b7af0e2611c.1793079714@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>

# HG changeset patch
# User Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
# Date 1793076459 -10800
#      Tue Oct 27 07:47:39 2026 +0300
# Node ID d08712494b7af0e2611c4b5148129fd4c5bc9c50
# Parent  e4d0a072a17b87c328265855e8bb43b54956b8ea
SSL: fixed syncing of keys with automatic ticket key rotation.

Optimized rotation of session ticket keys as introduced in
8085:043006e5a0b1 (1.23.2) changed the number of keys used from 2 to 3,
but the number of keys synced from shared memory to worker processes was
not updated.  As a result, an uninitialized key was used within worker
processes, making it possible to forge a session (CVE-2026-97629).  The
fix is to sync the correct number of keys.

See also:
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/1916f26e6ca49296568633d309777e36527e5bb2

diff --git a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
--- a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
+++ b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
@@ -5456,7 +5456,7 @@ ngx_ssl_rotate_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ssl_
     /* sync keys to the worker process memory */
 
     ngx_memcpy(keys->elts, cache->ticket_keys,
-               2 * sizeof(ngx_ssl_ticket_key_t));
+               3 * sizeof(ngx_ssl_ticket_key_t));
 
     ngx_shmtx_unlock(&shpool->mutex);
 


From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 05:41:55 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?utf-8?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 08:41:55 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2 of 3] Fixed r->main->blocked overflow with many subrequests
In-Reply-To: <patchbomb.1793079713@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>
References: <patchbomb.1793079713@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>
Message-ID: <19f937a6a6bf0c24dacf.1793079715@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>

# HG changeset patch
# User Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
# Date 1793076899 -10800
#      Tue Oct 27 07:54:59 2026 +0300
# Node ID 19f937a6a6bf0c24dacfce1068d4153656b9f995
# Parent  d08712494b7af0e2611c4b5148129fd4c5bc9c50
Fixed r->main->blocked overflow with many subrequests.

Similarly to r->main->count overflow by subrequests as addressed by
6238:8c6e71722aff (which became possible after subrequest limiting
changes in 6237:06e850859a26), r->main->blocked might overflow if there
are multiple AIO operations.  This could result in a request being freed
prematurely, followed by accesses to already freed memory when an AIO
operation completes (known as CVE-2026-97205, though security impact is
questionable).

The fix is to use 16 bits for the r->main->blocked counter, so the
subrequest limit introduced in 6238:8c6e71722aff ensures that it does
not overflow.

See also:
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/6adfc05ece48f92446383ec1f145446848694698

diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_request.h b/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ struct ngx_http_request_s {
     ngx_http_cleanup_t               *cleanup;
 
     unsigned                          count:16;
+    unsigned                          blocked:16;
     unsigned                          subrequests:8;
-    unsigned                          blocked:8;
 
     unsigned                          aio:1;
 


From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 05:41:56 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?utf-8?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 08:41:56 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 3 of 3] HTTP/3: kept the skipped frame length separate from
 data length
In-Reply-To: <patchbomb.1793079713@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>
References: <patchbomb.1793079713@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>
Message-ID: <75d4162de2b359af3163.1793079716@vm-bsd.mdounin.ru>

# HG changeset patch
# User Vadim Zhestikov <v.zhestikov at f5.com>
# Date 1793074233 -10800
#      Tue Oct 27 07:10:33 2026 +0300
# Node ID 75d4162de2b359af3163b932599f40d2ebb80cf3
# Parent  19f937a6a6bf0c24dacfce1068d4153656b9f995
HTTP/3: kept the skipped frame length separate from data length.

ngx_http_v3_parse_data() stored the remaining length of a skipped
(unknown) frame in st->length -- the same field the request body
filter uses for the number of DATA payload bytes to pass on as
request body.  When an unknown frame was split across parser
invocations, the skip was interrupted with st->length holding the
skip remainder; on the next buffer the body filter, which calls
the parser only while st->length == 0, treated that remainder as
request body.

When proxying, this could result in sending unframed bytes, potentially
allowing for bypass of client_max_body_size, which is enforced only on
the DATA path, or an injection.

The fix is to keep unknown frame payload in a separate st->skip counter.

Reported by Hansol Lee of GOTROOT.

Obtained from:
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/1c173a2d8767730e678c27446138d7ae5dd6fd64

diff --git a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
--- a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
+++ b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
@@ -1831,6 +1831,8 @@ ngx_http_v3_parse_data(ngx_connection_t 
                            st->type, st->length);
 
             if (st->type != NGX_HTTP_V3_FRAME_DATA && st->length > 0) {
+                st->skip = st->length;
+                st->length = 0;
                 st->state = sw_skip;
                 break;
             }
@@ -1840,7 +1842,7 @@ ngx_http_v3_parse_data(ngx_connection_t 
 
         case sw_skip:
 
-            rc = ngx_http_v3_parse_skip(b, &st->length);
+            rc = ngx_http_v3_parse_skip(b, &st->skip);
             if (rc != NGX_DONE) {
                 return rc;
             }
diff --git a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
--- a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
+++ b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ typedef struct {
     ngx_uint_t                      state;
     ngx_uint_t                      type;
     ngx_uint_t                      length;
+    ngx_uint_t                      skip;
     ngx_http_v3_parse_varlen_int_t  vlint;
 } ngx_http_v3_parse_data_t;
 


From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:15:51 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:15:51 +0300
Subject: [nginx] Version bump.
Message-ID: <hg.fd63bc28cb53.1793117751.-7182860794848868931@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/fd63bc28cb53
branches:  
changeset: 9592:fd63bc28cb53
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 07:47:28 2026 +0300
description:
Version bump.

diffstat:

 src/core/nginx.h |  4 ++--
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diffs (14 lines):

diff --git a/src/core/nginx.h b/src/core/nginx.h
--- a/src/core/nginx.h
+++ b/src/core/nginx.h
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
 #define _NGINX_H_INCLUDED_
 
 
-#define nginx_version      1031004
-#define NGINX_VERSION      "1.31.4"
+#define nginx_version      1031005
+#define NGINX_VERSION      "1.31.5"
 
 #define freenginx          1
 

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:15:52 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:15:52 +0300
Subject: [nginx] Updated OpenSSL and PCRE used for win32 builds.
Message-ID: <hg.e4d0a072a17b.1793117752.-7182860794848868931@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/e4d0a072a17b
branches:  
changeset: 9593:e4d0a072a17b
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 07:47:31 2026 +0300
description:
Updated OpenSSL and PCRE used for win32 builds.

diffstat:

 misc/GNUmakefile |  4 ++--
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diffs (15 lines):

diff --git a/misc/GNUmakefile b/misc/GNUmakefile
--- a/misc/GNUmakefile
+++ b/misc/GNUmakefile
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ TEMP =		tmp
 
 CC =		cl
 OBJS =		objs.msvc8
-OPENSSL =	openssl-3.5.8
+OPENSSL =	openssl-3.5.9
 ZLIB =		zlib-1.3.2
-PCRE =		pcre2-10.48
+PCRE =		pcre2-10.49
 
 
 release: export

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:15:52 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:15:52 +0300
Subject: [nginx] SSL: fixed syncing of keys with automatic ticket key rot...
Message-ID: <hg.d08712494b7a.1793117752.-7182860794848868931@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/d08712494b7a
branches:  
changeset: 9594:d08712494b7a
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 07:47:39 2026 +0300
description:
SSL: fixed syncing of keys with automatic ticket key rotation.

Optimized rotation of session ticket keys as introduced in
8085:043006e5a0b1 (1.23.2) changed the number of keys used from 2 to 3,
but the number of keys synced from shared memory to worker processes was
not updated.  As a result, an uninitialized key was used within worker
processes, making it possible to forge a session (CVE-2026-97629).  The
fix is to sync the correct number of keys.

See also:
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/1916f26e6ca49296568633d309777e36527e5bb2

diffstat:

 src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c |  2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diffs (12 lines):

diff --git a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
--- a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
+++ b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
@@ -5456,7 +5456,7 @@ ngx_ssl_rotate_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ssl_
     /* sync keys to the worker process memory */
 
     ngx_memcpy(keys->elts, cache->ticket_keys,
-               2 * sizeof(ngx_ssl_ticket_key_t));
+               3 * sizeof(ngx_ssl_ticket_key_t));
 
     ngx_shmtx_unlock(&shpool->mutex);
 

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:15:52 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:15:52 +0300
Subject: [nginx] Fixed r->main->blocked overflow with many subrequests.
Message-ID: <hg.19f937a6a6bf.1793117752.-7182860794848868931@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/19f937a6a6bf
branches:  
changeset: 9595:19f937a6a6bf
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 07:54:59 2026 +0300
description:
Fixed r->main->blocked overflow with many subrequests.

Similarly to r->main->count overflow by subrequests as addressed by
6238:8c6e71722aff (which became possible after subrequest limiting
changes in 6237:06e850859a26), r->main->blocked might overflow if there
are multiple AIO operations.  This could result in a request being freed
prematurely, followed by accesses to already freed memory when an AIO
operation completes (known as CVE-2026-97205, though security impact is
questionable).

The fix is to use 16 bits for the r->main->blocked counter, so the
subrequest limit introduced in 6238:8c6e71722aff ensures that it does
not overflow.

See also:
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/6adfc05ece48f92446383ec1f145446848694698

diffstat:

 src/http/ngx_http_request.h |  2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diffs (13 lines):

diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_request.h b/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ struct ngx_http_request_s {
     ngx_http_cleanup_t               *cleanup;
 
     unsigned                          count:16;
+    unsigned                          blocked:16;
     unsigned                          subrequests:8;
-    unsigned                          blocked:8;
 
     unsigned                          aio:1;
 

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:15:52 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:15:52 +0300
Subject: [nginx] HTTP/3: kept the skipped frame length separate from data...
Message-ID: <hg.75d4162de2b3.1793117752.-7182860794848868931@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/75d4162de2b3
branches:  
changeset: 9596:75d4162de2b3
user:      Vadim Zhestikov <v.zhestikov at f5.com>
date:      Tue Oct 27 07:10:33 2026 +0300
description:
HTTP/3: kept the skipped frame length separate from data length.

ngx_http_v3_parse_data() stored the remaining length of a skipped
(unknown) frame in st->length -- the same field the request body
filter uses for the number of DATA payload bytes to pass on as
request body.  When an unknown frame was split across parser
invocations, the skip was interrupted with st->length holding the
skip remainder; on the next buffer the body filter, which calls
the parser only while st->length == 0, treated that remainder as
request body.

When proxying, this could result in sending unframed bytes, potentially
allowing for bypass of client_max_body_size, which is enforced only on
the DATA path, or an injection.

The fix is to keep unknown frame payload in a separate st->skip counter.

Reported by Hansol Lee of GOTROOT.

Obtained from:
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/1c173a2d8767730e678c27446138d7ae5dd6fd64

diffstat:

 src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c |  4 +++-
 src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diffs (32 lines):

diff --git a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
--- a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
+++ b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
@@ -1831,6 +1831,8 @@ ngx_http_v3_parse_data(ngx_connection_t 
                            st->type, st->length);
 
             if (st->type != NGX_HTTP_V3_FRAME_DATA && st->length > 0) {
+                st->skip = st->length;
+                st->length = 0;
                 st->state = sw_skip;
                 break;
             }
@@ -1840,7 +1842,7 @@ ngx_http_v3_parse_data(ngx_connection_t 
 
         case sw_skip:
 
-            rc = ngx_http_v3_parse_skip(b, &st->length);
+            rc = ngx_http_v3_parse_skip(b, &st->skip);
             if (rc != NGX_DONE) {
                 return rc;
             }
diff --git a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
--- a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
+++ b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ typedef struct {
     ngx_uint_t                      state;
     ngx_uint_t                      type;
     ngx_uint_t                      length;
+    ngx_uint_t                      skip;
     ngx_http_v3_parse_varlen_int_t  vlint;
 } ngx_http_v3_parse_data_t;
 

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:15:52 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:15:52 +0300
Subject: [nginx] freenginx-1.31.5-RELEASE
Message-ID: <hg.3c2243e86475.1793117752.-7182860794848868931@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/3c2243e86475
branches:  
changeset: 9597:3c2243e86475
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 17:54:54 2026 +0300
description:
freenginx-1.31.5-RELEASE

diffstat:

 docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml |  40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diffs (50 lines):

diff --git a/docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml b/docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml
--- a/docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml
+++ b/docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml
@@ -7,6 +7,46 @@
 <section title="freenginx">
 
 
+<changes ver="1.31.5" date="2026-10-27">
+
+<change type="security">
+<para lang="ru">
+??? ?????????????? ????????? ?????? ?????????? TLS session tickets
+???? ?? ?????? ????????? ????????????????????,
+??? ????????? ????????? ??????
+? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ???????????? (CVE-2026-97629).
+</para>
+<para lang="en">
+one of the keys was left uninitialized
+when using automatic rotation of TLS session ticket keys,
+making it possible to forge a session
+and bypass client certificate verification (CVE-2026-97629);
+</para>
+</change>
+
+<change type="bugfix">
+<para lang="ru">
+??? ????????????? AIO ? ???????????
+? ??????? ???????? ??? ????????? segmentation fault.
+</para>
+<para lang="en">
+a segmentation fault might occur in a worker process
+if AIO was used in subrequests.
+</para>
+</change>
+
+<change type="bugfix">
+<para lang="ru">
+? HTTP/3.
+</para>
+<para lang="en">
+in HTTP/3.
+</para>
+</change>
+
+</changes>
+
+
 <changes ver="1.31.4" date="2026-09-01">
 
 <change type="bugfix">

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:15:52 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:15:52 +0300
Subject: [nginx] release-1.31.5 tag
Message-ID: <hg.1afd63fe64f0.1793117752.-7182860794848868931@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/1afd63fe64f0
branches:  
changeset: 9598:1afd63fe64f0
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 17:54:55 2026 +0300
description:
release-1.31.5 tag

diffstat:

 .hgtags |  1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diffs (8 lines):

diff --git a/.hgtags b/.hgtags
--- a/.hgtags
+++ b/.hgtags
@@ -498,3 +498,4 @@ b1585cfeee5759a1ae3794b5c9c4c541c3c73a35
 e3c5f3106d3837629514c0f5cb9aac189c07e432 release-1.31.2
 47e34b225e5f13ceacadba8a37e27ce9a299b2fb release-1.31.3
 eb9af667479439edb90b77efcb90e9e41bbec75f release-1.31.4
+3c2243e864752f550d8cf81cc346505ca46b10c3 release-1.31.5

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:16:31 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:16:31 +0300
Subject: [nginx] Version bump.
Message-ID: <hg.11a7b974ea7f.1793117791.-3145593467477725308@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/11a7b974ea7f
branches:  stable-1.30
changeset: 9599:11a7b974ea7f
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 17:56:35 2026 +0300
description:
Version bump.

diffstat:

 src/core/nginx.h |  4 ++--
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diffs (14 lines):

diff --git a/src/core/nginx.h b/src/core/nginx.h
--- a/src/core/nginx.h
+++ b/src/core/nginx.h
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
 #define _NGINX_H_INCLUDED_
 
 
-#define nginx_version      1030001
-#define NGINX_VERSION      "1.30.1"
+#define nginx_version      1030002
+#define NGINX_VERSION      "1.30.2"
 
 #define freenginx          1
 

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:16:31 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:16:31 +0300
Subject: [nginx] Updated OpenSSL and PCRE used for win32 builds.
Message-ID: <hg.7f9214ba6c7c.1793117791.-3145593467477725308@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/7f9214ba6c7c
branches:  stable-1.30
changeset: 9600:7f9214ba6c7c
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 18:00:17 2026 +0300
description:
Updated OpenSSL and PCRE used for win32 builds.

diffstat:

 misc/GNUmakefile |  4 ++--
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diffs (15 lines):

diff --git a/misc/GNUmakefile b/misc/GNUmakefile
--- a/misc/GNUmakefile
+++ b/misc/GNUmakefile
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ TEMP =		tmp
 
 CC =		cl
 OBJS =		objs.msvc8
-OPENSSL =	openssl-3.5.6
+OPENSSL =	openssl-3.5.9
 ZLIB =		zlib-1.3.2
-PCRE =		pcre2-10.47
+PCRE =		pcre2-10.49
 
 
 release: export

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:16:31 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:16:31 +0300
Subject: [nginx] SSL: fixed syncing of keys with automatic ticket key rot...
Message-ID: <hg.6d93cde1cd19.1793117791.-3145593467477725308@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/6d93cde1cd19
branches:  stable-1.30
changeset: 9601:6d93cde1cd19
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 07:47:39 2026 +0300
description:
SSL: fixed syncing of keys with automatic ticket key rotation.

Optimized rotation of session ticket keys as introduced in
8085:043006e5a0b1 (1.23.2) changed the number of keys used from 2 to 3,
but the number of keys synced from shared memory to worker processes was
not updated.  As a result, an uninitialized key was used within worker
processes, making it possible to forge a session (CVE-2026-97629).  The
fix is to sync the correct number of keys.

See also:
https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/1916f26e6ca49296568633d309777e36527e5bb2

diffstat:

 src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c |  2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diffs (12 lines):

diff --git a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
--- a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
+++ b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
@@ -5456,7 +5456,7 @@ ngx_ssl_rotate_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ssl_
     /* sync keys to the worker process memory */
 
     ngx_memcpy(keys->elts, cache->ticket_keys,
-               2 * sizeof(ngx_ssl_ticket_key_t));
+               3 * sizeof(ngx_ssl_ticket_key_t));
 
     ngx_shmtx_unlock(&shpool->mutex);
 

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:16:31 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:16:31 +0300
Subject: [nginx] freenginx-1.30.2-RELEASE
Message-ID: <hg.dc19dd157ae1.1793117791.-3145593467477725308@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/dc19dd157ae1
branches:  stable-1.30
changeset: 9602:dc19dd157ae1
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 18:05:08 2026 +0300
description:
freenginx-1.30.2-RELEASE

diffstat:

 docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml |  20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diffs (30 lines):

diff --git a/docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml b/docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml
--- a/docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml
+++ b/docs/xml/nginx/changes.xml
@@ -7,6 +7,26 @@
 <section title="freenginx">
 
 
+<changes ver="1.30.2" date="2026-10-27">
+
+<change type="security">
+<para lang="ru">
+??? ?????????????? ????????? ?????? ?????????? TLS session tickets
+???? ?? ?????? ????????? ????????????????????,
+??? ????????? ????????? ??????
+? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ???????????? (CVE-2026-97629).
+</para>
+<para lang="en">
+one of the keys was left uninitialized
+when using automatic rotation of TLS session ticket keys,
+making it possible to forge a session
+and bypass client certificate verification (CVE-2026-97629);
+</para>
+</change>
+
+</changes>
+
+
 <changes ver="1.30.1" date="2026-06-02">
 
 <change type="change">

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:16:31 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:16:31 +0300
Subject: [nginx] release-1.30.2 tag
Message-ID: <hg.0633ec329d5d.1793117791.-3145593467477725308@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/0633ec329d5d
branches:  stable-1.30
changeset: 9603:0633ec329d5d
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 18:05:09 2026 +0300
description:
release-1.30.2 tag

diffstat:

 .hgtags |  1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diffs (8 lines):

diff --git a/.hgtags b/.hgtags
--- a/.hgtags
+++ b/.hgtags
@@ -495,3 +495,4 @@ e4207f631186855d37ac286799c8cd4c9477d166
 cac0fa5721386abbec57dcc2bb317f2531456e19 release-1.29.7
 f126ef64a014db167927741688c74ffdf1b0fc26 release-1.30.0
 3945b69e1c4218e98a85a7a0e152e77c9d4fc83b release-1.30.1
+dc19dd157ae15beb5df6a3acd250b19528b2eb84 release-1.30.2

From mdounin at mdounin.ru  Tue Oct 27 16:17:01 2026
From: mdounin at mdounin.ru (=?iso-8859-1?q?Maxim_Dounin?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:17:01 +0300
Subject: [nginx-site] freenginx-1.31.5, freenginx-1.30.2
Message-ID: <hg.fe927fcf9ba5.1793117821.1021621698179490942@ns3.mdounin.ru>

details:   http://freenginx.org/hg/nginx-site/rev/fe927fcf9ba5
branches:  
changeset: 3139:fe927fcf9ba5
user:      Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
date:      Tue Oct 27 19:12:42 2026 +0300
description:
freenginx-1.31.5, freenginx-1.30.2

diffstat:

 text/en/CHANGES                |  12 ++++++++++++
 text/en/CHANGES-1.30           |   7 +++++++
 text/ru/CHANGES.ru             |  13 +++++++++++++
 text/ru/CHANGES.ru-1.30        |   8 ++++++++
 xml/en/security_advisories.xml |   7 +++++++
 xml/index.xml                  |  13 +++++++++++++
 xml/versions.xml               |   2 ++
 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diffs (131 lines):

diff --git a/text/en/CHANGES b/text/en/CHANGES
--- a/text/en/CHANGES
+++ b/text/en/CHANGES
@@ -1,4 +1,16 @@
 
+Changes with freenginx 1.31.5                                    27 Oct 2026
+
+    *) Security: one of the keys was left uninitialized when using automatic
+       rotation of TLS session ticket keys, making it possible to forge a
+       session and bypass client certificate verification (CVE-2026-97629);
+
+    *) Bugfix: a segmentation fault might occur in a worker process if AIO
+       was used in subrequests.
+
+    *) Bugfix: in HTTP/3.
+
+
 Changes with freenginx 1.31.4                                    01 Sep 2026
 
     *) Bugfix: the "index" directive used old values of non-cacheable
diff --git a/text/en/CHANGES-1.30 b/text/en/CHANGES-1.30
--- a/text/en/CHANGES-1.30
+++ b/text/en/CHANGES-1.30
@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
 
+Changes with freenginx 1.30.2                                    27 Oct 2026
+
+    *) Security: one of the keys was left uninitialized when using automatic
+       rotation of TLS session ticket keys, making it possible to forge a
+       session and bypass client certificate verification (CVE-2026-97629);
+
+
 Changes with freenginx 1.30.1                                    02 Jun 2026
 
     *) Change: the logging level of the "invalid ccs message", "not on
diff --git a/text/ru/CHANGES.ru b/text/ru/CHANGES.ru
--- a/text/ru/CHANGES.ru
+++ b/text/ru/CHANGES.ru
@@ -1,4 +1,17 @@
 
+????????? ? freenginx 1.31.5                                      27.10.2026
+
+    *) ????????????: ??? ?????????????? ????????? ?????? ?????????? TLS
+       session tickets ???? ?? ?????? ????????? ????????????????????, ???
+       ????????? ????????? ?????? ? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ????????????
+       (CVE-2026-97629).
+
+    *) ???????????: ??? ????????????? AIO ? ??????????? ? ??????? ????????
+       ??? ????????? segmentation fault.
+
+    *) ???????????: ? HTTP/3.
+
+
 ????????? ? freenginx 1.31.4                                      01.09.2026
 
     *) ???????????: ????????? index ???????????? ?????? ????????
diff --git a/text/ru/CHANGES.ru-1.30 b/text/ru/CHANGES.ru-1.30
--- a/text/ru/CHANGES.ru-1.30
+++ b/text/ru/CHANGES.ru-1.30
@@ -1,4 +1,12 @@
 
+????????? ? freenginx 1.30.2                                      27.10.2026
+
+    *) ????????????: ??? ?????????????? ????????? ?????? ?????????? TLS
+       session tickets ???? ?? ?????? ????????? ????????????????????, ???
+       ????????? ????????? ?????? ? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ????????????
+       (CVE-2026-97629).
+
+
 ????????? ? freenginx 1.30.1                                      02.06.2026
 
     *) ?????????: ??????? ???????????? ?????? SSL "invalid ccs message",
diff --git a/xml/en/security_advisories.xml b/xml/en/security_advisories.xml
--- a/xml/en/security_advisories.xml
+++ b/xml/en/security_advisories.xml
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ Patches are signed using one of the
 
 <security>
 
+<item name="Session forgery when using automatic rotation of TLS session ticket keys"
+      severity="medium"
+      cve="2026-97629"
+      good="1.31.5+, 1.30.2+"
+      vulnerable="1.23.2-1.31.4">
+</item>
+
 <item name="Memory corruption in the ngx_http_mp4_module"
       severity="medium"
       advisory="http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-announce/2022/RBRRON6PYBJJM2XIAPQBFBVLR4Q6IHRA.html"
diff --git a/xml/index.xml b/xml/index.xml
--- a/xml/index.xml
+++ b/xml/index.xml
@@ -8,6 +8,19 @@
 
 <news name="freenginx news" link="/" lang="en">
 
+<event date="2026-10-27">
+<para>
+<link doc="en/download.xml">freenginx-1.30.2</link>
+stable and
+<link doc="en/download.xml">freenginx-1.31.5</link>
+mainline versions has been released,
+addressing the
+<link doc="en/security_advisories.xml">session forgery</link>
+vulnerability
+when using automatic rotation of TLS session ticket keys (CVE-2026-97629).
+</para>
+</event>
+
 <event date="2026-09-01">
 <para>
 <link doc="en/download.xml">freenginx-1.31.4</link>
diff --git a/xml/versions.xml b/xml/versions.xml
--- a/xml/versions.xml
+++ b/xml/versions.xml
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 <download tag="mainline" changes="">
 
+<item ver="1.31.5" name="freenginx" />
 <item ver="1.31.4" name="freenginx" />
 <item ver="1.31.3" name="freenginx" />
 <item ver="1.31.2" name="freenginx" />
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@
 
 <download tag="stable" changes="1.30">
 
+<item ver="1.30.2" name="freenginx" />
 <item ver="1.30.1" name="freenginx" />
 <item ver="1.30.0" name="freenginx" />
 <item ver="1.29.6" name="freenginx" />